

A Study of the possibility of the coherence of values with facts by U.T

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I

Unification Thought(hereafter to be inscribed as U.T.) seeks the theory to resolve the ultimate problem of human being. Of course, the problem is how to find the way to happiness of human beings.

In Philosophy, axiology is last stage of research. But in order to make sure of the validity and legitimacy of it, we should find the coherence of facts and values.

First the theories of value up to now will be discussed, and the view of U.T about axiology will be referred in the process of discuss.

If a phenomenon or a value are not identified with its being, we can't regard them as true one.

Hessen said that human being is determinated one as natural being, but teleological one seeking value. Human beings feel values and recognize facts, and that is the essential character of human being. However, if a value is not consistent with facts, it can't subsist as a true one. Thus through the philosophical history, most of philosophers have tried to resolve the problem of the coherence of value and facts. However, the problem has not been resolved yet and it leaved the task difficult for us to resolve. So, that a value should be derived from being or facts, is an unconditional and categorical proposition, but we couldn't set up the logical frame to identify a value with facts. By accomplishing this task, the objectivity and rationality of value can be assured.

In the process of philosophical study, the theory of value is the last concerning realm. About any object we are concerned, we first argue the truth or falsity of it, nextly we discuss how we can understand true one, and lastly we argue whether it is worth or not. And we evaluate our behaviour, in other words, we argue if our behaviour is valuable. Thus the quest of value is the final achievement of the goal of our existence.

However, Hessen, being concerned about the theory of value, argued that there is a difference between value and facts. That is, firstly, the differences are that value itself is unreal and ideal, thus the existing mode of value is ideal existence or validity, and actuality as a real existence is opposite against ideal being, secondly, that value is abstract. The being exists out of sensory view and in sublime manner. On the contrary, a real being is described as a concrete one. Thirdly, that the character of value is normative. It means that ought and demand are included in value and that there is a difference in the point of view that actuality has not normativeness but only factuality. So he maintains that a value is distinguished from actuality through the structure of being.

We can consider sensitivity and reason as a basic faculty in the point that human being as a existing one recognize facts and human being as a teleological one feel value. Reason is a ability of recognition and sensitivity is the acting subject which accept value in cooperation with reason.

However the problem of the coherence of value to facts should go beyond the logical

stage. At any rate, a value is being regardless of whether or not value coheres with facts, and it is the last goal of human being.

II. The cognition and practice, and emotion

The process of cognition in Kant is constructed by the unity of the matter given from sensitivity. He understands that the subject having the form of being and the predicate having the form of thinking are absolutely identified. Here, the relation of being and the thinking are not same as the relation of reason and sensitivity, but we should note that sensitivity and reason make cognition in cooperation each other on the successive process.

The goal Socrates tried to arrive was Happiness. He maintained that in order to arrive it, we should practice virtue, furthermore in order to practice virtue, we should have true knowledge. For he thought the virtue can be practiced only through the true knowledge. I think, while human behaviour is accompanied by emotion, knowledge is the product of reason.

And the character of Platonic philosophy is 'Idea', but the theory of Idea is essentially one of axiology, thus the Idea is also Idea of value(J.Hessen, The theory of Value). Platon, positing the ultimate goal at the Idea of Good, put the ethical value on the peak of all values.

For Aristoteles, the good is the basis of every thing and he try to find the absoluteness of things from order. From this two mainstream of western philosophy, we can find the hint for the inseparability of facts and values.

For Kant at the summit of western philosophy, the moral value is not only subjective but it stands on the conviction that being is identified with the good in its essential core and ground on the base of the firm belief about the authority of metaphysics,

Lotze, the founder of modern axiology, devide the facts and values and he puts the area of value against the area of being. However he insists that the being and value stand on the common relations and reality is identified with metaphysical content of value.

Here, the key of the division of value and being in Lotze may be found in the difference of process and structure understanding it. However, can the intellect and sensitivity be divided apparently?

Falk seeking the coincidence of cognition and practice, between the people having the concept of pure instrumental rationality and the people preserving possibility of direct cognition approaching the truth about the rational aim, is trying to take the middle position.

We generally attach importance to the language of reason rather than moral language. But for him there is no two sorts of 'ought'. The one is moral ought and the other rational one, but they are consequently only one. We can see the unification of rational reason and practical behaviour from the view of Falk. Such the view of Falk is found in the view of Brentano. Brentano maintained that the ultimate goal of human behaviour is not determined only reason, and the goals are attributed to our emotion and tendency, thus emotion is ultimate as well as perception is the ultimate condition.

The elements of our mental action are intellect, emotion, and volition. But do they act separably each other? That is, does the intellect act separably from emotion and volition? Also does sensitivity act separably from intellect and volition? Maybe human mentality act in cooperation with these elements one another. Notwithstanding, we think

that every element of human mentality acts individually. But it is only the part of logical explanation and not the factual explanation. From those facts, we can see our intellectual cognition and the motion of emotion do not take place independently.

III. Facts and Values

The problem of facts and values is the core thesis of axiology. The question of knowledge and wish is the essential object of the investigation of human being, And in view that human being exists and pursue at an aim, these two direction are opposed to each other. In the part of logical situations, of course, those two parts are not identical. For the one is being, and the other is the abstract object of wish. Non the less, since the direction is the aspects for human being to seek a goal, there should be the source to combine both.

Does fact or being have values? Perry argues that reality and existence *per se* do not imply goodness or badness, but actualities and existences may be good, bad, or indifferent depending on being 'objects of interests' or being 'qualified to be objects of interests. Thus he adds that it is evident that instrumental values, potential and actual values, are derived from facts.¹⁾

Furthermore, Stern points that we reflect our own existence, and we are ourself an objects for our thinking. But we think and, in this sense, we attribute a similar activity to all other persons whom we encounter as objects in our experience. This attribution of activity to other persons entails a metaphysical problem. The purpose of this attribution entails metaphysical demand for the apprehension of the object as subject- the demand for transcending the subject-object opposition. When in consequence of such transcending, reality is understood entirely as activity, then our metaphysical concern shifts from the sphere of pure substantiality to a sphere of pure actuality. Hence a metaphysics of being may be impossible, however, metaphysics is possible 'as metaphysics of values'.²⁾

Besides, Hall points that there are two ways for value to be related with facts closely. One is that there are the facts of people's belief and the behaviour led by value, the other is that value always in itself embarrass a sort of reference to possible facts. In viewing Hall's standpoint, we know he sees the problem of value and facts in the angle of practice. Viewing the situation in the logical point rather than the actual point, in Hall's position, it seems that value is on the base of facts. In order to approach the problem of existence and value, Lepley propose the problem of the verifiability of value. He leads the problem to the relation between the normative ought and factual existence. In the setting of total experience the normative acts are seen to be the natural expression of the needs and desires of complex and selective organisms and descriptive acts are precisely the attempts to discover physical, social, and personal conditions and relations for them to be(exist) or to become feasible and to discern the effects which promise actually to eventuate or which have eventuated from possible lines of action.³⁾

Thus, *is* and *ought* are interrelated indivisibly in the total situation of purposive action. Lepley adds that "the prime facts which make descriptive and normative functions necessary for each adjustment are the situation which *is*, on the one hand, and the alive creature with selective wants, on the other hand"(ibid., p.132). In that situation, that which is descriptive and that which is normative act commonly each other. So, the former can't act without the latter and also the latter can't act without the former. Lepley

continues his argument. According to him, between both, there is another difference to be considered and it is the difference between the factual and the creative. Therefore, the difference between the evaluative experiences having the view about the aspects of science and factuality-creativity is only relative. According to him, evaluative adjustment as well as factual adjustment is affected by the subjective and objective interaction. Hence the aspects and properties of facts as well as value are, in a sense, the products of creative imaginative power. Therefore, for him, *is* and *ought* do not run against each other.

There are several views about values. Values are essentially psychological in property and those are based on emotion, desire, or interests. And values are being as things, events, or the properties and relations of situation and values are survival, universal, and purposive one, and those exist or appear facts whether we recognize and experience it or not. Thus those have the independent creative character of theirs from the determinative special interaction same as facts

We can find the clear distinction of difference between value and fact from Hessen. According to Hessen, value itself is unreal and ideal and its mode of existence is ideological being or validity, and reality as an actual being is opposite against ideal being. As value is abstract, its being is out of sensitive view. While value is being in the mode of sublimity, the real being is described as concrete one. And he argued that values appear normative, and in values ought and demand are included, thus value is distinguished from reality by the structure of being. But in spite of the difference, Hessen argues, those are not divided. Hessen's argument seems to have clarified very obviously the difference of existential structure and the side of its relation.

IV Character of value

As several philosophers argued, if value is not being but 'useful' or valid, there must be the subject to evaluate it. However, because, in the process of evaluation, the subjectivity of the subject can not but participate in it, value is defined as "the property to fulfill the desire of subject." U.T. explains the character of value as followings. "When an object has a quality that satisfies the desire or wish of the subject and which is recognized as such by the subject, then that special quality of the object can be called value."⁴⁾ Here we can note the point that in definition of value, the relation of subject and object is stressed by U.T. Therefore, the problem of value can't be argued without the relation of subject and object

Scheller who maintained the absolute axiology, although he stressed real value, positing the cognition of value in the intuition of essence, thought that we could evaluate the height of value. According to him, the more eternal, the less diminishing, the less being oppressed, the bigger the degree of satisfaction, the less be limited by Dasein, the higher the degree of value will be.⁵⁾

Here we can see there are not the objective criterion to evaluate the degree of values. Thus, Ehrenfehls thought the source of value as demand and feelings, Urban thought it as emotion. Jessup also said, "feeling is either derivative of desire or contributory to desire as the defining concept of value."

In these discussion hitherto, most of all regarded value as subjective one, but some philosophers add the quality such as reality to value. Mackie insists that an ethical judgement makes us think the objective being of value as real, according to Hume's

projectivism, there are only the world of natural property and our emotional reaction to moral agreement or disagreement. And he claims that we send such a reaction back to the world and say as if it contained the property such as the good or the bad. In projectivism, they discriminate nature into two parts, that is, the nature as reality, the nature experienced by us, and the latter is regarded as the reflection or projection of the nature of us ourself.

On this point of view, Blackburn insists that the quasi-realistic projection tries to explain the form of ethical practice, and such the ethical discuss is right. For in spite of its appearance, it does not include any wrong reference to objective value.⁶⁾

If we agree to regard the character of value as such, in discussing value, we should set forth the analysis of demand of subject as a premise. According to U.T, the axiologists, excluding the problem of human demand, have dealt with only the appearance of it, and it is the same as a tree without roots.

Lotze explained "the nature of things is not in thought, we can't understand the things but all the mentality experience the essential meaning of all the thing and those action in the form of its activity and action." From that explaining, we can see that value will be experienced by the thought and activity of human rather than by the grasp of the essence of things themselves

V. Existential value and the value of ought

If we apply the problem of facts and values to the problem of human behaviour, it is reduced to the problem of *is* and *ought*. Scheller supports this view, saying all of ought are based on value.⁷⁾ And Hartmann also said that the moment of ought belongs to the essence of value. Then how does value exist? There is realism of value to concede the being of value itself, but originally value can't be the existence to be itself('ens in se'), it is the existence to be dependent upon others('ens in alio'). So to speak, value can't be by itself, but stands on by others. Value exists as the state of character, quality, being, and the ground of worth of things can be found in actuality.

In Aristoteles, the logic and the metaphysics are intertwined each other, the order of thinking and the order of being are not able to be divided, thus the shape of thinking is mentioned as the shape of being, and the law of thinking is mentioned as the law of being. So, logical order as well as axiological order is intertwined with metaphysic order. In general, the recognition of being by Greek does not commit any contradiction in recognizing being as the good.⁸⁾

But in modern age, the people tried to resolve the philosophical problems with rational consciousness, but they, consequently, recognized that being and ought are not identified each other and there is a difference between 'is' and ought. Thus they recognized that the logic as well as the axiological is different from the ontological. Against this, in Hartmann, value was ideological one. Therefore, for him, value belongs to being. However, value is different from real being sharing quality of being. For value has the ideality of worth. But for him, since reality is filled with values, absorbed of values, being one is the carrier of diverse values.

Against preceding philosophers, Przywara rejects the argument of division of value and existence, and he maintained the coincidence of existence and value, saying that value is "the regularity of essence itself of existence without relation with self." And he said, "value as well as physical things is the inner state of essence of being and the attitude of

being." Consequently, for him, "the rank of value" is found in the rank of "the essence of being."⁹ From those discussion, we can find the possibility of coherence of being and value. Furthermore, Lotz maintained that something is worthwhile not because of evaluation, but it is evaluated because of having value. Such the view is called value objectivism, and it is maintained to be derived of the unity of the essence of being and value.

In our behaviour, the moral consciousness is a kind of peculiar value feeling.

VI. The connectivity of nature and human behaviour

Nature exists on the law of being, that is, the law of nature. Even if we do not have the verifying process on the being of it, we can be well informed about the being of the law of nature by our total structure of cognition. Nobody deny that our behaviour is the function of the law of nature. Our behaviour is formed according to the condition of our physical life. We preserve our body warm with warm clothes when it is cold, and we preserve our body cool with cool clothes. And when we feel hungry, we should eat foods. Such the acts are adaptation to the law of nature, that is, the law of being. Healing disease means that the condition of body is restored to normal state of body, and it is an application of the law of nature.

The law also is applied to ethical behaviour. When we analyze the basic facts, we can obviously notice that everything has the relation of 'give and receive.' That is applied in ethical behaviour. the golden rule is also same as this. According to U.T, in the law of 'give and receive,' there are characteristics of correlativity, purposiveness and centrality, harmony, order and position, individuality and relatedness, identity_maintaining nature and developmental nature, and circular motion.¹⁰ Such those properties are accompanied by the basic structure of being having relation of subject and object.

VII. The possibility of the coherence of value and fact

We can meet a few philosophers having tried to clarify the possibility of coherence of values and facts logically. Hudson has discussed the process to derive value from facts with the discussion of Searle and Gewirth in his *Moral Philosophy*

He premises that moral judgement follow the factual statement, and that thinking morally intuit such this connection, then introduces the views regarded as the ground for moral judgement. Those are followings. First is that the adequate ground for moral judgement is logically dependent upon a sort of human desire or another sort of human desire. Second is that those are grounded on the concept of the purpose or function of human. Third is that those are originated from the moral tradition of the society from which the judgement comes. Although D.Hume maintained that "ought" can't be involved by 'is(being)' and argument is deductive and imperfect and conclusion is that there is a logical gap between moral judgement and natural, supernatural statement of facts, Searle and Gewirth tried to derive value from being.

Before developing this discussion, Searle proposes different type of facts. That is, one of it is institutional facts, and the other is pure facts. Without saying, the institutional facts are the facts in our institute, that is, in the system of structural rule and pure facts are the pure matter of facts.¹¹ On the base of these facts, he practice the work. He explains that the utterance "I promise" is the relative to promising, and "duty, behaviour,

righteousness, and responsibility of many patterns are similarly instituted things," and it takes a promise to objective partner. Thus he tries to derive "ought" of "is" with this action of duty step by step. The stages of his derivation are followings.

- 1) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
- 2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
- 3) Jones placed himself under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
- 4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
- 5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

Searle thinks that from the stage of utterances, we can derive ought(value) from facts. The stage 1), 2), are the utterance of facts to promise paying money. From the stages, Jones has the obligation to pay money. Therefore, Jones ought to pay money. For me, the promise to pay is only the expression of Jones' will, and not the objective facts to pay. Therefore, the utterance of Jones, "I promise to pay" is a tautology like the "Jones ought to pay."

Antony Flew criticised that there is a gap in this connected relations, pointing to the difference between the case of using the word, "promise" as the ideal terms and independent reporter, and the case of using the word, "promise" as the participant, and maintained that if someone change from being an independent reporter to participant, it will be possible by the trust to the protected value to guarantee for us to induce the normative conclusion. So to speak, a promise may be the problem of the will of promising subject, but not the problem of "is", itself. Consequently, Searle's attempt does not seem to arrive success.

Gewirth also tries to deduce deriving "ought" from "is" more thoroughly. He, in *Reason and Morality*, regards 'is' as a performing of conduct, and defines the conduct as "the voluntary and purposive behaviour."¹²⁾ First of all, he analyzes the concept of human behaviour. Those are, first, the substantive one, "what do human being do?," second, the distributive one, "for whom do we do?," and third, the justifying one, "why do we do it?." On the base of the analysis of the concept of behaviour, he tries to deduce "ought(value)" from "is(being)."

He tries to derive "ought" of "is" by 7 stages.

- 1) "I do X for purpose E."
- 2) "E is good."
- 3) "My freedom and well-being are good as the necessary conditions of all my actions."
- 4) "I have a right to freedom and well-being ."
- 5) "All other agents ought to refrain from interfering with my freedom and well-being."
- 6) "All prospective purposive agents have a right to freedom and well-being."
- 7) "I ought to refrain from interfering with the freedom and well-being of all prospective, purposive agents."

Hudson criticise Gewirth's preceding derivation. According to his criticism, in relations with the derivation "ought" from "is", if we start from the statement of assumption about the facts to make the value judgement, obviously that is out of the point. And he criticizes, the facts that Gewirth expresses the speaker's being highly motivated along to describe performing of his action and he criticises that to say about stage **(1)expressly are out of the point.**

From the preceding discussion, Gewirth stresses that the ultimate justification of

morality is reason and the supreme principle of morality is justified by the genetic property of behaviour, but on the contrary, the ultimate justification of the supreme principle is affirmed to be in reason by deductive rationality. Then did Gewirth's argument succeed in the derivation of "ought" from "is" satisfactorily? At least, we feel that it is very hard for us to concede the derivation of 7 stage contentedly.

Perhaps it may be impossible to derive the conformity of facts and values, and the conformity of "ought" and "is". For facts and values are heterogeneous each other. However, analysing the subject of facts and values, we can presume the accordance of its contents. U.T., by the concept of "Sungsang" and "Hyungsang," tries to derive value from facts. Every being, the subject of facts and values, prepares the sides of "Sungsang" and "Hyungsang." The principles of being of both sides are the law of ethics and the law of nature.

In U.T, all beings having both side of 'Sungsang' and 'Hyungsang' unifiedly, there are the relation of counterpart between the law of ethics, the law of Sungsang, and the law of nature, the law of Hyungsang. In ontology, it is very important to find 'Sungsang' and 'Hyungsang' as the elements of being. The elements, 'Sungsang' and 'Hyungsang' are very useful and rational to clarify the principle of being. 'Sungsang' is the inner part and 'Hyungsang' is the outer part. If we call the presentation of spirit human behaviour, that is controlled by the law of ethics, human body, the side of 'Hyungsang' is controlled by the law of nature.

However, 'Sungsang' and 'Hyungsang' are not respectively independent elements but those form existence by being unified. Thus the law of controlling both must be unified or identified. Therefore, U.T. shows that true value is being only on union of the law of nature and the law of ethics, only such the view of value based on the union of two laws can get out of the confusion of the view of value. We can notice that on the base of it, the absolute value can be established. This absolute value is established by eternal and absolute being, on the base of the value individual value is formed. So, such a view must be a perfect one.

Therefore, in U.T., value is coherent to facts. Of course, it is not coherent in logical area. Furthermore, according to U.T., the absolute value is based on the true love of the absolute, God.¹³⁾ And the absolute value can be established only when the values of truth, goodness, and beauty are harmonized. The value of truth is the base of true society, and the value of goodness is the base of ethical society, and the value of beauty is the base of society of art, the society of beauty. The society possessing such the values is an ideal society. The new view of value is fundamental in establishing the ideal society.

E. Durhkeim maintained that sociology as a science should not be affected by value judgement, and only 'a social fact' has a legitimate roll in sociological explanation, and the sociological explanation seek only its effective cause. Such the view pointed that value judgement has a problem in presenting facts objectively in the description of facts. None the less, showing that scientific and social value promotes the happiness of human being and social solidarity, he stressed that it helps for us to determine the validity of moral value and the practice for society, furthermore, he emphasized the necessity of actual being of moral value. And he thought the science verifying society is imperfect unless it set up the science of morality as its task and he led his interest to the moral value rooted on free social fact and shifted his interest from scientific study of morality to moral judgement. Thus he insisted that social science produced practical results.¹⁴⁾

We can find the view similar to Duhrkeim's view in Weber's view. Maintaining there is

an unconditional division between experiential facts and evaluation of those facts, Weber denied the connection of science and value. For him science and value are heterogeneous each other. Notwithstanding, he agreed that moral value and the other values are very important with Duhrkeim, and conceded that facts and norms are connected with each other in practice of social science.

Fichte tried to unify the theory and practice through the Jena system. He maintained that without practical effort there is not theoretical cognition, and vice versa. So his final philosophical task was the conciliation of freedom and necessity. So to speak, it was to explain that how we intend freely and that the morally responsible agent are considered simultaneously in space and on time as one part of the physical world conditioned causally. His strategy begins with the groundless conclusion of the subjective spontaneity and the freedom(infinteness) of self and then proceeds to transcendental derivation of objective necessity and the limited as necessary condition to the former possibility.¹⁵⁾ It suggests that the conciliation of freedom and necessity is possible only on the base of conciliation of being and value.

And Hall examines by percussion the possibility for value to approach facts cautiously. He asks if there is obvious predicative value-sentence not normative sentence formally. So he tries to explain it by an illustrative sentence. For instance, he thinks that value term may be determined as something made predicate from the sentence "John may not be intellectual but he is obviously good." So, calling such a sentence 'value-descriptive sentence' he discriminates it from the normative sentence.¹⁶⁾

From the discussions, on base of being, in the sense that value occupies the important part indivisible from being, it is meaningless to question whether value is being or not, merely we are sorry that we can't clarify the logical and scientific ground of it.

Hartmann also examines by percussion the possibility of the coherence of value and facts. So, he discriminates the degree of facts, accordingly discriminates value in corresponding to it. Continuously he maintained that because something to be means some 'facts', we can say about the degree of degree in numberless special facts, that is, social, physical, historical, economical, ethical, botanical, geological facts.¹⁷⁾ therefore, for him, something which is true for facts is true in value.

VIII. Conclusion

As we argued precedently, according to U.T., the fundamental law controlling nature is not dialectic method but the law of 'give and receive' and it has the form of being on the base of the relation of opposite partners. By the form of relation of subject and object, performing the action of 'give and receive' for a goal, every being preserves its being.

As many people know, it is not easy for us to agree with the argument that value is coherent to fact logically. But the being of value and fact is real and it is commonly necessary for the subject of human being, and it is true that fact is the prerequisite condition of value. For value does not sustain without fact. Therefore, value never be "the existence to be itself"(自存有) but "the existence to be upon others."

We call 'unconditional' or 'absolute' value as independent value regardless of the desire of environment or individual. Münsterberg also assume the absolute value accepting such the actual situation affirmatively. He maintains that the validity of value is the norm connected to all the intellectual beings thinking and sharing our world. For him, since every desire and the behaviour of our will are the activity of special individual and

many individual, value as a norm is independent regardless of desire and all behaviour of will.¹⁸⁾

Münsterberg, furthermore, maintains that the action of 'world-affirmation' includes whole system of value, and the absolute value is classified into 3 parts. Those are 'the value of preservation,' 'the value of harmony,' and 'the value of activity,' and consequently, those are based on the value of being. The value of being is an absolute value in the meaning that it satisfies the demand of 'the pure will' that some identical being exists as the object of it.¹⁹⁾ In Münsterberg, the value of being is the value related with preservation of his own, and it is logical or recognizable one. And he insists that the limitation of will is related to our 'inner limit' and it is a authentic meaning.

In Platonism, "reality is value" and "being is good." Therefore, vice is "the lack of being" as disvalue.²⁰⁾ Aquinas also, in relation with this, maintained that everything as being is good, and everything that is not dependent upon the good, is vicious.²¹⁾ Hereby, the logical and the axiological are unified and that becomes firm as the ontological one.²²⁾

We can translate the word 'the good' into the word, 'valuable.' And being accepts value and value is the keeper of value. As we discussed before, in U.T., we presented the correspondence of the law of ethic and the law of nature with the concept of "Sungsang" and "Hyungsang." Thus we can exemplify several cases of logical and factual ground to support it. For instance, the vertical and horizontal order of universe is in accord with the vertical and horizontal order of a family, too. If the galactic system of universe and the order of solar system are vertical, then the movement of planets is the horizontal system of order. In family, if the relation between parents and sons and daughters is vertical system of order, then the relation between brothers and sisters is horizontal system of order. Thus U.T. suggests to establish the vertical view of value, horizontal view of value, individual view of value harmoniously.

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Note

- 1) cf. Perry, *Ralph Barton, Realms of Value*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954. p.460.
- 2) vgl. Stern, Alfred, *Die philosophischen Grundlagen von Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit, Wert*, München, 1932.s. 321.
- 3) cf. Lepley, Ray, *Verifiability of Value*, New York, 1944, p.130
- 4) Unification Thought Institute, *New Essentials of Unification Thought*, Printed in Japan, 2005. p.225
- 5) vgl. M. Scheller, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Halle, 1916. ss.89-96
- 6) <Value, ontological status of> in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge 1988
- 7) vgl. M.Scheller, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik*(Halle, 1916) s. 79
- 8) vgl. Hartmann, *Ethik*, s. 59
- 9) vgl. E.Przywara, *Religionsgründung*, Max Scheller _J.b Neuman(Freiburg, 1923) ss. 91-92
- 10)cf. Unification thought Institute, op.cit., p.249
- 11) cf. W.D.Hudson, *Moral Philosophy*, 2nd edition, the Macmillan Press(Hong Kong, 1983. p.251
- 12) cf. A. Gewirth, *Reason and Morality*, Chicago and London, 1978, p.22
- 13) cf. ibid., p.246
- 14) <Value judgement in social science> in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge
- 15) cf. Edward Craig, ed.,<Fichte> in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, London and New York, 1988,
- 16) cf. Hall, Everett W., *Modern Science and Human Value*, Princeton, 1956. p.162.
- 17) cf. Hartmann, Robert S., *The Structure of Value*, revised English Version of La Estructura del Valor, Carbondale, 1967. p.96.
- 18) cf. Münsterberg, Hugo, *The Eternal Values*(Boston and New York, 1909. p.40
- 19) cf. ibid., p.99
- 20) cf. Augustinus, *Confessions III*, n.12.
- 21) cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologia I*, q.49, a.3.
- 22) cf. Hessen, 진교훈 웅김, 가치론, 서광사, 1992. p.67